Democratisation and Modernisation: De- or Re-constructing Corporationality, Developmentality, and Phallogicality?

The Inscriptive-Reinscriptive play between the Developmental State and Social Movements

CHONG SU KIM

PhD Candidate, University of Victoria

csk@uvic.ca

Abstract: Modernisation of South Korea is often conceived of a unitary process orchestrated by the developmental state. The autonomous, embedded, and strong "image" of the South Korean developmental state limits the academic imagination on democratic transition in South Korea to a few ready-made formulas like reforma, transformation, or transaction that would affect the type of democratic consolidation. The unitary, homogeneous, and static image of the developmental state, democratic transition and consolidation not only obscures but also distorts the dual dynamics between state and non-state actors during the pre- and post-transitional democratisation in South Korea. In fact, the seemingly homogenous modernisation project of South Korea was constructed upon the three distinct but correlated pillars for organisation and mobilisation: corporationality; developmentality; and phallogicality. In this paper, I show how South Korean labour, environmental, and women's movements have responded to corporationality, developmentality, and phallogicality respectively and thereby renegotiated the contents of democracy. By exploring the inscriptive-reinscriptive play between the state and non-state actors in the couterpublic, public, and liminal and hetero spheres, this paper show the unequal and uneven processes and developments of democratisation in South Korea which is constantly over-and inter-negotiated between and among these actors.

***Keywords**: South Korea, developmental state, social movements, democratisation, corporationality, developmentality, phallogicality, counterpublic spheres, liminal spheres*

** This is a Working Paper. Please Do Not Quote.*

INTRODUCTION

Mapping democracy in political science often begins and ends with transforming hilly and mountainous geography into a wide flat plain. If this fattening mission fails, then the rough geography ought to be changed at least into plateaus by adding imaginative adjectives like procedural, consensual, illiberal, deliberate, and many others. These adjectives explain the differences between species within the genus of the democracy but are not so helpful to understand the diversity within a species and its dynamic metabolism. This paper attempts to contour the uneven relief of the *topos* of democracy. In this paper I do not take the birds eyes view to have a contour map and I cannot take the worms eyes view without ethnographic research. Instead, I contour the map based on inhabitants' view (Lefebvre, 1968), using social movements as bridging agents that links by inhabiting in the space of democracy the macro polity changes with micro social changes.

The interactive and dynamic democratic process in South Korea (henceforth Korea) and the active role of non-state actors in democratisation contradicts the received image of the strong developmental state and submissive civil society (Huntington, 1991; Jones, 1998; Neher and Marlay, 1995). The Korean case of democratisation shows ensembles of diverse paths: path-dependent, -shaping, -interdependent, and -interpenetrating. The central tenets of my paper are that democracy is not a static and homogeneous political system and democratisation is not an even, homogeneous, and monolineal process. In order to map the uneven, heterogeneous, and multilineal processes, I combine socio-political spaces, modernisation-democratisation processes, and the inhabitants of these spaces and processes. After brief sketch of research questions and methods, I describe at first the changes of the developmental state between pre- and post-transition. It shows how the state inscribed the modernisation movement in society and how this

movement has been challenged. Second, I compare two collective identities—*minjung* (mass and people) and *shimin* (burgher and people)—that emerged before and after the transition respectively. Differences between the pre-transitional *minjung* movement and post-transitional *shimin* movements highlight how differently movements based on these identities responded to and affected the changes of the developmental state. Third, based on the analysis of these two macro movements, I compare three meso-movements—labour, environmental, and women's movements, which were born respectively with, after, and before the transition. The comparisons of external-, intra-, and inter-movement relationships show how they reinscribed the state's modernisation movement and how these relationships affect democratisation and vice versa.

In this paper I explore democratisation in South Korea as an interactive play and process between various factors and actors. I suggest what they drew was an uneven contour of democracy that stands always "under construction" (Tilly, 1997).

RESEARCH QUESTION: DEMOCRACY WITHOUT DEMOCRATISATION?

Modernisation of Korea is often conceived of as a unitary process orchestrated by the developmental state based on "embedded autonomy" (Evans, 1994). The autonomous, embedded, and strong "image" (Migdal, 2001) of the Korean developmental state limits the academic imagination on democratic transition in Korea to a few ready-made formulas like "*reforma*," (Linz, 1978; Valenzuela, 1992) "transplacement," (Huntington, 1991) or "extrication" (Mainwaring, 1992). The focus of these formulas narrows down the democratic transition or democracy to changes of the governments through fair and competitive elections (Huntington, p. 7; Mainwaring, p. 2; O'Donnel and Schmitter, 1986). The ensuing second transition is usually nothing more than the consolidation of this procedural democracy. For my present paper, the

problems and dangers of these approaches are two-folds. First, they obscure the dynamic and dialectic processes of democratisation by restricting democracy to a formal procedure for the choice of decision-makers, or if you like, "democratic method" (Schumpeter, 1976). In these formulas, the mobilised population for democracy disappears from the episodic transitional game or negotiation such as the "founding election," and satisfied with its limited role as an audience but not actors. Second, these approaches simplify multiple, heterogeneous, dynamic *processes* and *practices* of democratisations to a unitary, homogeneous, and static *project* and *image* of transition and consolidation initiated by elites and the developmental state.

The central questions of the present paper are: is democratisation a unitary and homogeneous process negotiated by actors of institutional politics? Do non-state actors disappear after setting the stage for transition while passively 'enjoying' "aggregative democracy" (Kymlicka, 2002, pp. 290-291)? If not, how do they influence post-transitional politics? Are there any differences of roles of the state and social movements and of relationship between them? If any, what are the differences and did they make any differences in the pre- and post-transitional democratisation?

Based on the above questions I pose the following propositions: 1) the pre- and post-transitional democratisation is not a unitary and homogeneous static project. Democratisation in Korea rose as a counter-hegemonic project against the hegemonic modernisation project that embodied corporationality (rationality of state corporatism), developmentality (*élan* or mentality of development), and phallogicality (the logic of phallus). Democratisation has been a process of re-interpretation and -negotiation to de- or re-construct these three pillars; 2) the path of democratisation is not only determined by or dependent on the critical juncture, or the types of logics of transition but over- and inter-determined by multiple factors like legacies of pre-transition, changes of state and non-state actors, those of their relationship, and others. 3) Korean

social movements did not disappear as the "cycles of contention" (Tarrow, 2011) predicts. They constitute "liminal" spheres (Sennett, 1999; Turner, 1969)[1] which interacts various state and non-state actors, which various types of politics flow in and out, and which makes democratisation a-static and -morphous; 4) the different nature and degree of movements' engagement in pretransition, thus the different relations with the state, and the intra-movement relationship significantly affect the contents of democratisation.

METHODOLOGY AND THEORY

This paper is a case study focusing on democratisation in Korea, interactions between state and non-state actors, and their effects on democracy. I divide the democratisation into pre-transition (mid-1970s-1987) and post-transition (1988-2007). The starting point of this periodisation corresponds to the crisis of the developmental state and the birth of new Korean social movements while the endpoint is related to the end of the liberal government. It demands an analysis exploring changes across democratisation, pre- and post-transition, and simultaneously an analysis investigating various actors, in particular social movements. It requires both longitudinal and crosssectional analysis. Further, to understand the dynamics of democratization better, I analyse changes at the macro-level, i.e., those of the state, and at the meso-level, social movements and their three constituents (labour, women, and environmental movements). This

[1] For Turner (1969), liminality is understood in temporal terms. Liminal phase as one phase of the three rites de passages is placed between separation from the social structure and reaggregation. This instable liminal phase is a "a symbolic milieu that represented both a grave and a womb" (pp. 94-5). Unlike Turner, the liminality, for Senett (1999), is rather a spatial term. He introduces a transitional space of ancient Greek polis between private and public spaces. This space is located at the margin of agora and straddles the stoa. This space blurs the borderline between public agora and private space (p. 276). The liminal spheres used in this paper involve both the temporal and spatial meanings and implies spheres bridging public and private spheres and political and civil societies. Thus, it involves both impersonal nature of public spheres and political society and intimate nature of private spheres and civil society.

multilevel comparison would clarify the general and particular changes of democratisation better than one level approach. In this paper, I compare three units: pre- and post-transitional developmental state; pre- and post-transitional collective indentities of social movements; three meso-level movements. Longitudinal comparison will be applied to all three units. I add the multilevel comparison to two macro-collective identities of social movements and three meso-movements. Crosssectional comparison will be added to the three meso-movements.

To explore the dynamic and interactive democratisation among multiple actors, I employ modify, and combine a set of theoretical approaches. First, regarding the Korean state, I adopt the term "developmental state" (Johnson, 1982; 1999; Woo-Cumings, 1999) which emphases active role of autonomous state based on plan-rationality with high political motivation like nationalism. Second, based on the Migdal's (2001) image-practices binary I try to explain the interaction between the state and non-state actors, for the developmental state approach is grounded on state-eyes and thus too state-centric; however, I do not intend to stick to Migdal's binary of a unified state image and multiple practices, for the state often pursues multiple images while non-state actors doing a unified practice under the grand narrative or the "mater frame". Third, I borrow and modify concepts related to political and social *topos* to show politics between the state and non-state actors and to illuminate politicisation of non-state actors: counterpublic spheres (Fraser, 1990); public sphere (Habermas, 1996); liminal spheres (Senett, 1999; Turner, 1969); and hetero spheres (Young, 1990). The purposes of employment of these concepts are to show autonomous capability of non-state actors to articulate and form their politics, to see the changes in modes of domination and resistance, and to see the overlayered negotiations among multiple actors. Four, I applies the concept of "contentious politics" (Tarrow, 2011) to this paper but only in a limited sense, for despite its usefulness for showing politics of

non-state actors and their interactions with the state it is not so useful to display the movements' continuity and the dynamics of intro-and inter-movements.

Before I proceed three crucial concepts are to be discussed: democracy, democratisation, and transition. As Whitehead (2002) suggests, democracy is an anchored but unstable concept and democratisation therefore a process of constant and open-ended process of socialisation, conversation, negotiation, and construction. Democracy used in this paper thus is not a narrowly defined formal procedure or universalisable normative model but rather contextualised and interpretative process which nevertheless shares the democratic principles of popular control and political equality of which quality are dependent upon social, economic, cultural rights (Beetham, 1999). Democratisation is an open-ended process as Whitehead argues but I do not share his metaphor—democratisation as a drama or theatre in which events or critical juncture and characters or heroic leadership play a key role, as Aristotle's well-plotted tragedy. I suggest that democratisation is a narrative process that constantly slippes out of a systemic and unilineal causal emplottment. I assume that transition involves two *tempos*: critical *kairos* and prudential *chronos*. When I use transition without any temporal prefix pre or post, it refers to critical *kairos*, the 1987 political and labour mobilisations, and founding election. The post-transition involves two versions of the second transition: socio-economic transition (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986) and institutional consolidation (Mainwaring, O'Donnell, and Valenzuela, 1992).

In the following sections, I first analyse the modernisation project of the Korean developmental state and its changes before and after the transition. Then, I explore the development of Korean social movements at the macro-level which is disaggregated into pre-transitional *minjung* (mass people) movement and post-transitional *shimin* (burgher people) movements. It shows movements' changed roles in and influences on democratisation and their

distinct spatial logics. Third, I explore how labour, environmental, and women's movements respond to corporationality, developmentality, and phallogicality respectively while comparing their changes between pre- and post-transition, and their extra-, intra-, and inter-movement relationship. It reveals the democratisation's uneven development which is over- and inter-determined by the nature of movements' participation in transition, by the characteristics of transition and legacies of the previous regime, and by interactions and negotiations between the state and non-state actors. Finally, I summarise the whole sections.

MODERNISATION, THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE, AND ITS MORPHOLOGY

"Nation with infinite life ought to be regenerated" was the general Park, Chung Hee's first new year's address in 1962 (Park, 2005, p. 33), after he had overthrown by May 16 *coup* in 1961 the democratic government established by the April Revolution in 1960. The justification for reauthoritarianization was based both on the negative reasoning—"formal democracy brought about only a catastrophe and destroyed our country" (Park, p. 34)—and on the positive one: modernisation. "[T]o generate energy for Korea's own *modernisation movement*" demands the restoration of "wisdom," (Park, 1979, p. 20, emphasis added), a continued boost of "mental attitude" for development (p. 95), and maintenance of a logic for construction and subordination but not destruction and insubordination (p. 86), which is, however, inconceivable without political stability and "total unity" (p. 94). The corporationality, developmentality, and phalllogicality constituted the part and parcel of this "modernisation movement." "[W]ithin the framework of class-divided societies, the state is inscribed in all social relations" (Jessop, 1990, p. 230). The inscription of the state is expressed its three pillars of the modernisation movement.

In this section, I analyse the modernisation project of the Korean developmental state and its changes before and after the transition. First, I explain the three pillars of the modernisation movement and how the state attempted to inscribe them into society. Then, I divide the section into pretransitional despotic developmental state and posttransitional hegemonic state. This section shows particular characteristics, *chaebol*-centric, of development in South Korea and a reference point linking these characteristics with those of labour movement which will be discussed in the later section. Further, this section displays that changes of the developmental state were primarily affected and enforced by the socio-political process rather than the *profundizacion* or deepening of industry as in the case of Latin American BA regime (O'Donnell, 1977, p. 54). The developmental state in Korea has not been always a collective philosopher,[2] rather its unitary and homogeneous image was under constant attack. To paraphrase Lipietz (1987) the "embedded" image of the state was in fact mirages, not miracles.

"Modernisation Movement": Corporationality, Developmentality, and Phallogicality

Although Schmitter (1974) warned to define corporatism on the basis of ideology, the Korean "state" or "authoritarian" corporatism was constructed not so much upon organisation as upon ideology. Unlike the societal or democratic corporatism (Schmitter, 1974; Katzenstein, 1985) in the West, the authoritarian corporatism during the pre-transitional period revolved around hierarchically organised state-business axis that not only did not represent the interest of labour but also excluded and repressed it (Choi, 1984; Dalton and Cotton, 1996, p. 274; 1996; Deyo, 1989; Onis, 1991, p. 118). The only legally permitted union, the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU), was before the transition an "administered mass organization [AMO]....created

[2] See Ha-joon Chang (1999) and Evans (1995).

and managed by a political regime to implement public policy" (Kasza 1995, p. 7). The underlying rationale of this authoritarian corporatism is the "regeneration" of the nation as a unitary *corpus* with "infinite" life (Park, 1979, p. 14; 2005, p. 32).

While corporationality established the state at the centre of political modernisation, developmentality mobilised *élan*, passion, and mentality for economic modernisation. Economic development demands both autonomous state and its entrepreneurship (Evans, 1995, pp. 30-21). The *élan* or mentality for development which lacked in the Latin American late-late-development (Hirschman, 1968, p. 9) was successfully mobilised through both fears of the war with the communist North and 'democratic instability' as a binding agent by the developmental state (Woo-Cumings, 1999).

The social phallogicality[3] was organised based on the establishment of political corporationality and the mobilisation of economic developmentality. The logic of phallus as a universal one works in two different ways, as the other universal logics always does: it overwrites one certain logic on other social texts while overriding the richness of the latter. Traditionally androcentric neo-Confucian Korean society and corresponding masculinised public sphere (Moon, 1994) were reinforced through militant and warrior discourses and institutionalised by compulsory three-year military service. Discourses like "industrial warriors," "export war," 'raise' the status of women workers to warriors defending the nation-state but they cannot enjoy full citizenship, for they are blocked from the rite of passage for it. The compulsory military conscription works through "normalization" (Foucault, 1984, pp. 196-7) like being

[3] By phallogicallity I mean the logics of phallus of which grammar, logic, and rhetoric underlie institutional and logical practices. Therefore, this already decentred logical practices differ from rather centred "foundations or anchorings of Western rationality… notion of male firstness" (Derrida, 1995, p. 96) or "regimes of power/discourse" (Butler, 1990, p. ix).

conscripted as normality and manhood as a norm and combines this logic with judico-political sovereignty and nation-building. It serves as "militarized modernity" (Moon, 2005), which constitutes one part of the twin-axis of modernisation movement: defence and economic development (Kim, H., 2004, p. 111; Park, 2005, p. 33). Moreover, this militarized modernity continuously reproduced gendered citizenship. The compulsory military conscription as a civic duty strengthens the position of men as protectors and breadwinners while reducing women as auxiliary citizens (Jones, 2006, p. 33). *Staatnation* or equal citizenship (Yuval-Davis, 1997) for women was repeatedly deferred and the masculinised public sphere detached them from *polis* and to *oikos* in the sense of reproduction and production.

The organisation of the three pillars during the pre-transition revolved around political corporatinality. Economic developmentality and social phallogicality stood under its command.

Developmental State: the Birth of an Image

The developmental state can be defined a plan-rational capitalist state that takes on developmental functions, not mere regulatory ones, and pursues industrial policy with socio-economic goals and strategic networks linked to private actors (Johnson, 1982). This definition rejects the binary of plan-ideological and liberal market-rational economy (Johnson, p. 18) on the one hand and politics- and institution-blind neo-classic and dependency paradigms (Haggard, 1990, p. 9). The political profile of developmental state in East Asia is deeply rooted in nationalism and war like the Pacific War and Korean War, while its social profile is closely linked with external actors like private corporations. These profiles imply that the developmental state possesses well-organised extractive and coercive functions and responsiveness, which was termed "embedded autonomy" by Evans (1995).

The Korean developmental state since the 1961 *coup* underwent several changes. The first was its shift from relative soft authoritarian state to a hard bureaucratic authoritarian (BA) type of state in 1972. As the 1961 *coup* as a response to the radicalising democratisation, this hard authoritarian state was a reaction to the increasing social and political pressure on the soft authoritarian state. In the face of increasing labour strikes caused by the end of surplus labour, massive urban riots, and the rise of popularity of opposition party in the early 1970s, the already "overdeveloped" state (Alavi, 1972, Choi, J., 1993, Im, H., 1987) initiated an *autogolpe*, Yushin (revitalisation) constitutional change in 1972 which strictly limited civil, political, and social rights. It abandoned direct presidential election and term limit of president and the president was given the power to declare emergency decree that can suspend even the constitution and to dominate judiciary and legislature. The Korean BA regime reorganised the developmental bloc. Based on overdeveloped bureaucracy, and monopoly of financial resources and of allocation of business licenses, the state promoted rapid industrialisation through industrial policy expressed in five-year development plan that organised and networked close ties between bureaucrats and private capitals. The developmental bloc centred on state bureaucrats and large conglomerates, *chaebol* like Samsung, Hyundai, and LG. Their relationship was not, however, "alliance" (Kim, E., 1997) "embedded" or "responsive dependence" (Johnson, 1982). Rather, the state "invented" and "nurtured" the Korean big bourgeoisie *chaebol* (Im and Choi, 2010). The industrial "deepening" from light industry to heavy and chemical industry (HCI) strengthened the position of *chaebol*. The proportion of sales of top ten *chaebol* in GNP went up from 15.1 percent in 1974 to 32.8 percent in 1979 (Amsden, p. 116). This reorganisation of the developmental bloc eventually changed the balance of power between the state and *chaebol* toward the latter's favour.

Developmental State: from the Despotic Image to Hegemonic Practices

The Korean developmental state had to undergo a further change in the 1980s for the increased pressure within and without the bloc. The series of massive urban riots and militant strikes of women's workers who were employed in underprivileged light industry and severely hit by the economic recession in the late 1970s eventually caused within the regime a political crisis that resulted in the assassination of Park. The new military elites led by General Chun, Doo Hwan came to the rescue of the developmental state through repression like massacre of protesting citizens in Kwangju in 1980. This violent repression was yet a signal of weakened developmental state. The failure of state-initiated industrial policy for HCI in the 1970s and the dramatically enlarged *chaebol* led to limited state intervention in the market and to economic liberalisation and internationalisation. As one result, the share of total sales in GDP in manufacturing from the five largest *chaebol* soared up from 22.3% in 1971 to 75.2% in 1987 (Kim, E., p. 183). The other result was the increased vulnerability of the Korean economy to global market as the 1997 "East Asian" financial crisis demonstrated (Chang, 2003, p. 117).

Democratic transition dramatically changed the landscape in which the state operated. The postwar authoritarian developmental state was thrown into the posttransitional pressure of the democratic deepening (Wong, 2004). The democratic uncertainty (Przeworski, 1986; 1991) and openness deprived the developmental state of its commanding status (Kim, E., p. 48). Despite differences in degrees and dimensions of this change of the developmental state, it attracted attentions of many observers: the change from state corporatism to sectoral corporatism (Mcnamara, 1999); from the comprehensive developmental state to the limited (Kim, E.); from despotic regime to the hegemonic (Koo, 2001); and even from the developmental state to the

neo-liberal (Pirie, 2008). This change has been accelerated by democratic pressure since 1987 democratic transition and 1997 neoliberal crisis.

The brief sketch of the Korean developmental state shows that its constant attempts to impose homologous and coherent "image" have been visited, attacked, and negotiated by myriad practices of multiple actors. Its three pillars of modernisation movement had to go through these practices. Corporationality has been undermined with the emergence of a strong civil society and by large corporations, *chaebol*. In particular, the Korean developmental strategy favouring *chaebol* reproduces slippages between corporationality *a la raison d'état* and *raison de la corporation.* Developmentality has been locked in the mentality of ever increasing returns and of gravediggers, a self-abandoning process for the authoritarian regime. Phallogicality has been stressed by self-contradiction, modernisation based on pre- and anti-modern logics.

BIOGRAPHIES OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES: *MINJUNG* AND *SHIMIN*

Though the modernisation movement orchestrated by the developmental state embodied the nation-state as a whole, implanted development at the heart, and placed manhood at the top, it had to face a counter-movement from the bottom. Against this state-initiated modernisation movement, Korean social movements developed two qualitatively distinct collective identities, *minjung* and *shimin*, corresponding to pre- and post-transition, respectively. This section compares two collective identities of movements. The purpose of this comparistion is: 1) to contrast the *minjung* movement subsuming and unifying other movements against the despotic pretransitional state with *shimin* movements consisting of autonomous and diverse movements against the hegemonic posttransitional state; and 2) to show the different natures and functions of

the socio-political spheres between counterpublic spheres constructed by the *minjung* movement and the liminal spheres (see footnote 1) shaped by diverse *shimin* movements.

Pretransitional *Minjung* Movement, a Multiclass Coalition as an Extended Proletariat

The rapid economic development—ca. 9 percent per annum between 1961 and 1980—during the pre-transition transformed society dramatically: the rate of urbanisation was more than doubled from 1963 to 1985; the proportion of manufacturing industry in GDP was doubled (Tongyŏchŏng, 1998).; and the number of male workers employed in the manufacturing sector increased five times while women workers more than seven times (Koo, 2001, p. 35). The rapid economic development revolving around the state-*chaebol* axis was founded on despotic repression by excluding the majority of the population from political processes and economic distribution, for the corporationality was not only non-democratic but also exclusive. For the Korean developmental state the dilemma faced by Latin American states to control and at the same time support workers was redundant and unnecessary as well (Koo, pp. 6-7).

Social movements that repeatedly failed to mobilise democratic force beyond intellectuals in the 1960s and early 1970s began to understand these rapid social changes and attempted to transform them into mobilising potential for democratisation. The necessary stimuli came from the subaltern struggles—urban poor's massive riots around the capital Seoul in 1971 and the self-immolation of a garment worker Chun, Tae-il against exploitive labour conditions and repressive labour regime. The series of subaltern struggles revealed the exploitative and barbaric nature of export-oriented industrialisation (EOI). They caused small group of critical intellectuals and political oppositions to move from their narrow master frame from the "restoration of democracy" to a new democracy. Since the mid-1970s social movements developed or revived a collective

identity: *minjung* (people and mass, meaning ordinary people). This term first emerged in the massive peasant revolt in late 19th century that pursed egalitarian community and struggled against the Choson dynasty and Japanese imperialism. *Minjung* was at the centre of this revolt. The reinvention of *minjung* was a counter-hegemonic project of social movements. The term stands in direct opposition to the state imposed term *gukmin* (nation people) and to the hierarchical, Confucian state nationalism. This collective identity as "suture" or "meeting place" (Hall, 1996) interlinked traditional collectives with modern identity, pre-modern cultural practices with the modern, communitarian utopia with modern socialism, and peasant revolt with multiclass—ranging from working class, peasant, lower middle class, urban poor, and often a progressive segment of intellectuals—revolution (Abelmann, 1995; Choi, J., 1993; Koo, 1993; Lee, N., 2007). This collective identity as an intersubjective process of "common cognitive frameworks" (Melucci, 1996) discovered, defined, competed, claimed, negotiated, shared and assigned meanings, actions, and goals. Thus, the mid-1970 *minjung* movement limited to cultural and religious movement—*minjung* literature and theology—transformed with the uprising and massacre in Gwangju in 1980 into a mass movement and equated with anti-systemic and pro-democratic movement. The *minjung* was reinterpreted from the oppressed people to extended proletariat as epic representation of future history.

Three examples would suffice to the *minjug* phenomena. First, it was not an unfamiliar sights in the 1980s that traditional mask dances and mimes satirising of ruling classes and appealing utopian visions of subaltern classes were played in demonstrations, universities, factories, and churches (Lee, N., pp.187-212). Second, in the 1980s a large number of students and intellectuals became factory workers—these students-turned-workers were called "disguised workers" and forbidden by the regime—to raise working-class consciousness among workers and to mobilise

them for democratisation. Between 1983 and 1986 alone, three thousand or more students became students-turned-workers (Ogle, 1990, p. 112). The Ministry of Labour reported that ca. 25 to 30 percent of labour disputes were organised by them (Kyŏkdong, 1985; Asia Watch Committee, 1986, p. 264). Third, it established *undongkwŏ*n (the movement sphere), counterpublic spheres (Fraser, 1990) which incubated democratic movements, provided a space of reorganisation and shared contentious repertoires and framings. Organisations like underground discussion groups and factory cells, networks like extra-parliamentary oppositions (*jaeya*) and student-work alliances, or diverse *minjung* cultures are examples of these more personal and intimate counterpublic spheres. Diverse movements—like women's and student movements—and their seeds were subsumed into the unified *minjung* movement under the master frame of democracy and nurtured in these counterpublic spheres.

The *minjung* movement was crucial to understanding democratisation in Korea: 1) it transformed the 'boring' socio-economic processes into a dynamic political narrative; 2) through this movement democracy was resignified from a procedural ("restoration" of formal democracy) to the substantive (radical *minjung* democracy); 3) it offered democracy and democratisation as a mater frame; 4) it formed an independent basis of movements that constituted in the transition the bottom dynamic of dual dialectic (Alvarez, 1990; Diniz, 1986); 5) the multiclass *minjung* movement strengthened not only the whole social movements but also encouraged its constituent subgroups to make its own voice; 6) counterpublic spheres served as a seedbed for democratising the public sphere and liminal spheres (see footnote 1) that interact with political and civil society.

The Posttransitional *Shimin* Movements, Diversity without a Master Frame

The democratic transition at first began with the liberalisation in 1984 and was intensified with its revocation in 1986. The transition culminated in two consecutive waves in 1987: the political June Uprising and the subsequent economic Great Worker Struggle. The month-long rallies of June Uprising forced the regime to do constitutional reform and direct presidential election, which constituted the cathartic moment of transitional drama. The June Uprising opened a new opportunity for workers. More than three thousands strikes swept Korea between July and September. In August alone, approximately 83 strikes occurred daily. The number of strikes, participants, and working days lost far exceeded that of the total from 1961 to 1986 (Roh, J., 2008, p. 227). Though the two waves brought about constitutional reform, the 1987 "founding election" resulted in the victory of the incumbent elites, for the forces struggling against authoritarianism divided too early (Przeworski, 1991, pp. 88-89). The result of the founding election corresponds to the type of transition "*reforma*," (Karl and Schmitter, 1991; Linz, 1978; Valenzuela, 1992), "extrication" (Mainwaring, 1992), and "transplacement," (Huntington, 1991) which is placed in the middle of the two extreme types of transition in transitional continuum: the one initiated and controlled by incumbent elites and the other resulted in regime breakdown or its defeat. This seemingly lukewarm transition encouraged some observers like Huntington (1991) and Jones (1998) to describe Korean society as docile and change-proof. Yet, as the subsequent government turnover in 1997 and resistant civil society forcing political parties to reforms proved them wrong, for they failed to see the interactions between the past legacies, the nature of transition, and non-state actors. Let me elaborate these three points.

First, unlike authoritarian regimes constructed upon one-party system like Leninist party dominance in Taiwan (Huntington, 1991; Cheng, 1989), the Korean state did not so much depend on political parties as on the military. Park, Chung Hee even suppressed his own ruling

party, while opposition parties were highly dependent on personal leadership, Kim, Youg-sam and Kim, Dae-jung, "two Kims." The underdeveloped political society developed contentious politics of social movements (Lee and Arrington, 2008). Second, the lukewarm transition determined by the balance between political and social dynamics (Diniz, 1986) could channel the political into procedural democracy like fair and periodic elections but was reluctant to embrace the social dynamic. Thus, the tranceplacement or *reforma* rejected the entry of radical *minjung* movement into formal democracy of which energy and resources were then left unconsumed. Third, therefore, the failed and rejected *minjung* movement had to transform itself or be transformed under the new conditions which it also partly shaped. Ironically, the multiclass *minjung* movement to make a voice of, by, and for voice-weak and -less groups was replaced by the latter, for they have now their own voices that obviated the need for one representative voice. There emerged a new collective identity, *shimin* standing for middle class citizens.

The deconstruction or reduction of *minjung* movement coincided with the rapid growth of the *shimin* movements. First, since 1987 and the collapse of the East European socialist states the radical *minjung* movement were isolated and ideologically discouraged by the state and media and reduced to subaltern groups or classes like the urban poor, peasant, and labour movements while *shimin* movements were encouraged (Park, M., 2008, p. 190). Second, the emergence of *shimin* movements mirrored the changed configuration of the developmental state which was subject to economic, political, social, and global liberalisation pressure and no longer stubbornly insistent on a unified image. Former radical constituents of *minjung* movement swiftly proselytised themselves into *shimin* movements, which promoted the rapid diffusion and acceptance of *shimin* movements among public. The establishment of the civil society organisations (CSOs) that played crucial role in the post-transitional period was initiated by

former activists for democratic transition. The number of CSOs grew explosively. Between 1996 and 1999, its number increased from 3,900 to 7,600 (Wein, 2000, p. 68). The deconstruction and reduction of *minjung* movement emancipated its constituents from the grand narrative for socio-political transformation, which led to democratisation of social movements, their discourses, and framings. Third, political democracy as the one sole "master frame" (Snow and Benford, 1992) was subject to being democratised. Democratisation of the state, market, and society were on the agenda of post-transitional *shimin* movements. Mushrooming issue-specific organisations like those for economic justice, gender equality, environment, and human rights was one of the characteristics of *shimin* movements (Koo, 2002, p. 42; Shin, K., 2006, p. 13).

Shimin movements inherited and developed legacies of the *minjung* movement. First legacy was "connective structures" (Tarrow, 2011) developed during the pre-transition. Though they are composed of diverse issue-specific movements, they often solidarise for common causes like political reforms and anti-corruption and support each other. Then, one of the dual dynamics that *minjung* movement constituted was overtaken and developed by *shimin* movements. They radicalised and concretised the abstract *minjung* project in everyday politics while limiting their contentious politics within the boundary of the constitution. On the top of that, the autonomous and personal counterpubic spheres based on this dynamic were transformed into liminal spheres that serve as a bridge between weak and thin public sphere, personal and thick private sphere, and institutional and strong political society (Habermas, 1998, pp. 341-387). Liminal spheres linking political and civil society transforms influence into power and vice versa. Reforms for welfare, healthcare, gender equality, financial systems, political parties, and state institution (including decentralisation and local autonomy) have been initiated by social movements since the late-1980s. The liminal spheres composed of CSOs and social networks can be maintained by

"embedded autonomy" of activated parts of civil society on the one hand and by underdeveloped political society on the other hand. The table 1 shows the differences between pre-transitional *minjung* and post-transitional *shimin* movements.

Table 1 *Minjung* and *Shimin* Movements

	Minjung (mid-1970s-1987)	*Shimin* (1988-2007)
Basis	Multiclass	Middle class
Nature	Material (redistribution)	Material+Postmaterial
Objective	Polity Transformation (Political Democracy)	Socio-political Reforms (political, social, and economic democratisation)
Target	Dictatorship	Underdeveloped Democratic Institutions and Neoliberalism
Type of the State Domination	Despotic Domination	Hegemonic Domination
Socio-Political Space	Counterpublic Spheres against the Authoritarian Public Sphere	Liminal Spheres with Hetero Spheres
Action Space	Offline	Off-+on-line
Primary Actors	(In)formal SMOs under a Master Frame (MF)	Formal SMOs consisting of Issue-specific Organisations without a MF
Repertoires	Sit-in, Occupations of public buildings, Rallies	Lawsuits, Mass Media Campaigns, Petitions, Rallies, Flash Mobs
Power Orientation	Macro-power	Meso- and Micro-power

POST-TRANSITION: DIVERSE POLITICS AND UNEVEN DEMOCRACY

In the following section, I scale down the previous macro longitudinal comparison to a meso-longitudnal and -crossectional comparison, in which three social movements will be compared, labour, environmental, and women's movements.

There are three reasons why I choose these three movements: 1) they respectively correspond to corporationality, developmentality, and phallogicallity; 2) their different birth dates bring into relief the varying effects related their involvement in transition; and 3) their different inter-

movement relationships show that not only the relationship between the state and non-state actors but also between the latters do matter in democratisation. While comparing I will argue the movements' extra-, intro-, and inter-relationships with others and the self play a crucial role in the posttransitonal democratisation: their incriptive-reinscriptive play with the state; the nature of movements' engagement in pre-transitional democratisation; and their links with other ones. These triple relationships demonstrate that democratisation, like the modernisation movement, have been intersected and cut across by diverse power-structures, -processes, and -agencies.

Labour Movement between Factories and Society

Deyo's (1989) generalisation of weak and peaceful labour movements in East Asian countries suffers from exceptionally militant South Korean labour movement. His remarks on the Korean labour movement remain ambiguous: Korea stands as an exception to the labor peace of these three other East Asian NICs….But in South Korea, as elsewhere, militancy has until recently resulted in few enduring gains for workers (p. 4). As the later development reveals, the militancy produced "enduring gains for workers." Korean labour movement since the post-transition era progressed from old "service model" towards "social movement unionism", as its South African and Brazilian counterparts do (Moody, 1997). These factors influenced the confrontational politics of labour movement.

The labour movement between the mid-1970s and 1986 suffered the despotic labour regime which actively involved in and severely repressed industrial disputes. Labour movement during this period was dependent on and supported by external actors like churches at first and then by the *minjung* movement (Minns, 2001, pp. 185-6). Women workers supported by these groups formed in the 1970s the democratic union movement, which politicised strikes. In the face of

severe repression of managers and regimes, women workers occupied in 1979 headquarters of the opposition New Democratic Party to gain its support, which attracted public sympathy and led eventually to the internal conflict of the authoritarian Park regime and its collapse in 1979. In addition to the 1980 Gwangju massacre and following repression, industrial restructuring from light industries to HCI since the mid-1970s and massive involvement of students-turned-workers in the 1980s changed the scene of the labour movement. First, the *chaebol*-centric restructuring of industries decreased the state power while increasing that of *chaebol*, which resulted in the shift from the despotic labour regime to hegemonic and more liberal one and opened a potential for workers employed in *chaebol* to organise themselves. Second, students-turned-workers highly politicised the labour movement. While the lack of militant artisan culture, discursive effects of the French Revolution, and supports of political parties enjoyed by European workers disfavoured Korean workers, these cultural, discursive, and politico-institutional resources were provided by students-turned-workers or the *minjung* movement (Koo, 2001).

The Great labour struggle as between July and September 1987 exploited the opened political opportunities by the June uprising for political democracy led by the *minjung* movement, its coalition with the opposition NDP, and middle class. The number of trade unions increased from 2,725 before the June 1987 to 5,062 and the union membership was doubled by the 1989 (Bae, Yoon, Cho, and Lee, 2008, p. 45). The demands of strikes were related primarily with wage-increase and democratisation of shop floors and labour-manager relations. Unlike strikes before the June 1987, those after June occurred in large corporations of *chaebol*—like Hyundai Heavy Industry and Hyundai Automobile—and without direct influence from the *minjung* movement. The workers' spin-off wave of the first political wave revealed the limits of political democracy and a need for socio-economic democratisation. Further, workers rejected the image of "epic

representation" as a master of history imposed by non-workers or the *minjung* movement but simultaneously paved the path towards the social movement unionism. The triple extra-, intra-, and intro-movement relationship shows this path and the politics of labour movement.

Extra-movement relationship: coporationality since liberalisation in the mid-1980s has been slowly shifted to and vacillated between state and corporate corporatism—or *chaebol* corporatism like the expression Korea as "Samsung republic"—and between *raison d'etat* and *de la corporation.* The establishment of the Korea Tripartite Commission was an attempt of the weakened state to transform the state corporatism to the social but failed by the resistance from both *chaebol* and trade unions. The *chaebol*-centric industrial structure divided workers into those employed in *chaebol* corporations and those in small and medium-sized companies (SMCs). It was ironically the result of the successful labour movement and its inscriptive-reinscriptive interplay with other actors. The rise of trade unions in *chaebol* corporations caused *chaebol* to heighten their industrial structure to survive in the global markets and widened wage differences of workers between those in *chaebols* and SMCs. The enterprise-based (not industry-based) union contributed also to the heterogeneity of those two groups (Koo, 2001, pp. 205-217).

Intra-movement relationship: workers' experience of political democracy was immediate but not direct. Labour movement did not directly participate in the democratic transition but emerged simultaneously with it. Labour politics and political and institutional reforms were relative foreign to the movement when compared to other movements, those directly and deeply involved in the transition. Instead of alliance-building or co-operation, labour movement developed contentious and confrontational politics under the authoritarianism. Thus, its militancy helped increase wage but not reform policy, for instance, against flexibilisation (Lee, Y., 2009). In addition to enterprise-based and *chaebol*-centric unions, this inexperience of co-operative

politics was ineffective to stop the flexibilisation of the labour market that divided workers into those with regular jobs and those with irregular ones. The maintenance of unionisation in *chaebol* corporations and the decrease in SMCs can be partly attributed this idiosyncratic nature of the Korean labour movement.

Inter-movement relationship: labour movement's relationship with *shimin* movements can be described as a constant competition (Eun, 2001) and partial co-operation with *shimin* movements. This competition was often framed by media as a conflict between the narrow class interest of the labour movement and the public good of *shimin* movements. This competition and tension led to the separation of socio-economic injustice from socio-economic equality and redistribution on the one hand and to failures to amplify and extend frames of labour politics against the neoliberal policies.

This extra-, intro-, and inter-relationship encouraged the labour movement to develop an independent social and political double wing strategy. In 1995, it founded the Korea Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) as a democratic union movement that organises union and social activities while successfully launching Democratic Labor Party in 2000 which concentrated on redistributive labour politics. Yet, the effectiveness of this socio-political double wing approach has been so far very limited. The labour movement has democratised shop floors but its limited political capacity prevented it from transforming social protest into policies for social democracy.

Environmental Movement between Popularity and Incapability

The environmental groups before the transition were limited to small intellectuals and church groups. Environmental issues were disregarded by the state under the imperative for industrial

development on the one hand and by other movements under the imperative for democracy (Kim, S., 2000). The first attempt to organise the environmental movement was the foundation of the Korea Pollution Research Institute (KPRI) in 1982. The discourse of the early environmental movement was focused on anti-pollution (Ku, 2004, p. 47; Lee, S., 1999, p. 96). The first groups engaged in environmental issues linked the anti-pollution to democratisation and understood themselves as a part of the democratic movements: the end of the anti-*minjung* regime is the shortcut to solve the pollution problem (KPRI, 1986). Nevertheless, the environmental movement emerged "after the democratic transition," not before (Kim, S. 2000).

The 1987 democratic transition opened new opportunities for environmental groups to develop environmental issues as a movement. The foundation of Korean Anti-Pollution Movement Association (KAPMA) in 1988 signalled the formation of the environmental movement. In 1993, KAPMA launched with local environmental groups the Korea Federation for Environmental Movement (KFEM) which grew into the Asia's largest environmental organisation (Lee, S., 2000, p. 150). The number of environmental organisations increased more than sixfold between 1987 and 1993 (Kim, S. 2000). The environmental movement kept its distance from the *minjung* movement and shifted its discourse from the grand narrative and anti-pollution to everyday politics and enviromentalism. The formation and the rapid growth of environmental movement can be largely contributable to the transitional and non-transitional effects. The latter are related to episodic events like drinking-water pollution and construction of nuclear waste disposal facilities, which raised public awareness and the popularity of environmental movement. The former are concerned with the activated political society in which ruling and opposition parties competed for pre-empting environmental policies and thereby co-operated with environmental groups and with the decentralisation that vitalised local

environmental groups. The emergence of the environmental movement after the transition but with competition with the labour movement limited in the long run its ability and channelled its politics into popularity-seeking, as the following triple movement relationship displays.

Extra-movement relationship: developmentality has been undermined both by the rapid economic development and the democratic transition. Yet, the liberalised South Korean economy was vulnerable to the neoliberal globalisation, subject to deregulation, and exposed to the pressure from the militant labour movement. This triple pressure reached an apogee in the 1997 financial crisis and it manifested the glorious return of developmentality. This time but not under the command of corporationality. Develpmentality weakened the basis of environmental movement through the revival of material value while enervating the post-material.

Intra-movement relationship: environmental movement emerged and expanded as mentioned above after the transition. As a "spin-off" movement, it exploited the political opportunities and repertoires used by the "initiators" (McAdam, 1995). The populist (Lee and So, 1999, pp. 292-294) and issue-specific approach of the environmental movement rooted in its nature of non-participation in the democratic transition and its own lessons from popular mobilisation as issue amplification. Thus, it can swiftly respond to episodic events, but its capability to produce alternative policy was very limited (Choi, S., 2006; Kang, 2007). Though it widely involved itself in the institutions of central and local governments, it failed to produce long-term environmental policies, 'eco-crats,' and eco-democracy against develop-cracy.

Inter-movement relationship: it is ambiguous, for it is co-operative with other *shimin* movements but tension-laden with labour movement. Most observers agree on that the media's friendly reporting on environmental movement between the late-1980s and the 1997 financial crisis helped its rapid growth and its position in opinion-formation in public sphere while

disfavoured labour movement. To sustain its inflated image, it kept distance from the radical *minjung* and militant labour movement. Its maintaining distance, if not widening, from the labour movement encouraged environmental movement to reduce its discursive and political gap with the state and corporations. The room for the post-developmental discourse was narrowed while that for sustainable development and for abstract and metaphysical harmonious co-existence between ecology and economy was widened (Ku, 2004).

The repeated failures of the environmental movement to launch a green party show its limited capability to develop an independent eco-politics and -democracy. It is partially institutionalised due to its popularity but partially underinstitutionalised due to its limited capability. Nevertheless, the hetero spheres composed of grassroots and eco-radical groups at the margin of the liminal spheres constantly keeps the environmental movement from being completely institutionalised.

The Women's Movement and its Polymorphology

The Korean women's movement as a social movement emerged in the early 1980s, but, unlike environmental groups, many Korean women actively participated in various *minjung* movement organisations in the 1970s. Moreover, though the militant women's labour movement in the late 1970s was repressed and disbanded, it provided one crucial source for later women's movement. With the foundation of the Association for Women's Equality and Friendship in 1983, Korean women put forward a clear agenda for women's liberation and formed women's movement (Kim and Kim, 2010, p. 198). Yet, under the universal banner of *minjung* and democracy, Korean women's movement before the transition neglected different gender interests by assuming "false homogeneity" (Molyneux, 1985, p. 232).. The dominant groups within the women's movement who prioritised class struggles over anti-patriarchy subordinated gender interests to *minjung*

liberation (Jones, 2006, pp. 46-7; Kim and Kim, p. 198; Moon, 2002, pp. 482-483). No minjung liberation no women's liberation.

The women's movement launched the Korea Women's Associations United (KWAU) as a umbrella organisation in February in 1987 and actively organised and participated in the June Uprising. The post-transitional women's movement promptly recognised that the *minjung* movement and political democracy do not adequately account for gender interests. The changed political, economic, and social environment around women challenged the previous grand narrative approach of women's movement. The changed balance between the state and *chaebol* flexibilised the labour market and the division of labour between men as breadwinners and women as caregivers. The decreased tension of the Cold War and the collapse of the East European socialist states increased the need for demilitarisation of society. Further, the increased legitimacy of post-transitional governments and (re)activated political and civil society opened a new terrain of institutional and lifeworld politics.

Extra-movement relationship: women's movement culturally and institutionally undermined phallogicality. The successful Anti-beauty Contest campaigns and Menstruation Festival in the 1990s, for instance, reinterpreted sexuality and the body (Kim, Y., 2000, p. 229), and problematised "phallocracy" (Jessop, 2008, pp. 121-123), the institutional aspect of phallogicallity. Korean women's movement deconstructed the institutional base of phallogicallity: for example, the abolition of the veterans' affirmative action policy in the national civil service examinations and family headship system. All these achievements were gained under the offensive of the state and *chaebol* to re-masculinise the public sphere since the 1997 financial crisis, as the public erection metaphor right after the crisis demonstrated: Korean Men! Rise! Korean Men! Rise!; Father, Cheer Up! The financial crisis promoted the recast of

three pillars of modernisation movement of the developmental state. Developmentality rejuvenated the enervated cultural aspect of phallogicality, which would legitimise the widening gap between the relatively well-organised men workers in large corporations and the women workers more exposed to fexibilisation policy in SMCs.

Intra-movement relationship: its direct involvement in the democratic transition strengthened on the one hand the capability of institutional politics of the women's movement and preserved its non-institutional radical politics. The umbrella organisations like KWAU in women's movement were actively involved in the formulation of gender politics of the civilian government in 1993. The establishment of the Ministry of Gender Equality in 2001 and the Standing Committee for Women in the National Assembly in 2002 produced "femocrats" and state feminism. Further, the various legal reforms—like the Women Development Law, the Law of Prohibition of Sex Discrimination, the Family Violence Prevention Law, the Gender Quota System—in the 1990s and 2000s can be contributed to its capability of opinion- and will-formation. Moreover, in the face of a changed environment, the women's movement diversified its agenda and strategy and simultaneously its organisational base (Kim, Y., pp. 230-234). It thus allowed hetero spheres of radical "indie" or "guerrilla" groups which cohabitate the liminal spheres with the institutionalised groups (Jones, p. 55). Moreover, in 1999 women workers founded their own union in the protest against the male dominant union structure and culture. It not only challenged the male dominant labour union movement but also made itself visible against the middle-class dominant mainstream and culturalist 'indie.' All these three constitute the basis of politics for the triangular issue areas: institution-culture-private/public-division.

Inter-movement relationship: the women's movement built a solid network with other movements. Its experience of network- and alliance-building during the pre-transition provided

the movement with rich social capital that enabled the movement to mobilise other *shimin* movements and political parties for gender politics while its inherited radicality allowed it to cooperate with the militant labour movement. This cooperation with the latter proved to be very beneficial for the enhancement of strategic and practical gender interests (Molyneux, 1985). It achieved the abolishment of compulsory retirement for women after marriage or pregnancy, the right to equal pay, the mandatory establishment of childcare facilities within workplaces of 300-plus employees, and the right to three months paid maternity leave (Jones, p. 78).

Uneven Democratisation with Different Politics

The environment the Korean social movements faced before and after the transition was different. The contour line of democracy and democratisation they drew was uneven. Their ability for opinion-, will-, and policy formation was not the same. It was not only dependent upon their own ability but also their pre-transitional history, relationships with the state and other non-state actors. Moreover, Korean social movements did not disappear after the deconstruction of the master frame. They reinterpreted, reformulated, and concretised it and processed the transitional social dynamics into new spatial ones which have kept them from being completely coopted and depoliticised: they transformed the personal and intimate counterpublic spheres into liminal spheres that accommodate contentious and agonistic forces and discourses, bridges institutional, public, and private spheres. Liminal spheres allowed movements to develop diverse politics without being fully institutionalised and with maintaining their ‘agonism.’

The first finding of comparison of three movements is that the degree of their activity and effectiveness do matter in the development of democracy. Women’s movement gained the greatest achievement both in institutional and cultural areas. Their interaction also affected the

quality and effectiveness of democracy. Phallocracy (Jessop, 2008, pp. 1210123), the institutional aspect of phallogicallity, has been significantly undermined through institutional and policy reforms, while cultural practices of phallogicality still remain persistently. Yet, the *chaebol*-centric developmental path, economic liberalisation, political democratisation, and thereby weakened developmental state contributed less to deconstruction of corporationality and developmentality. Second, the cooperation and non-cooperation between movements, for instance, affected the quality and quantity of socio-economic justice, citizenship, and family-market relations. The cooperation between labour and women' movements contributed to relative successful blurring of the strict division between the male bread-winner and female care-giver model and combining of the strategic and practical gender interests (Molyneux, 1985). The non-cooperation and competition between labour and environmental movements led to underdevelopment of red-green alliances (Cho, D., 1996) and of eco-democracy. Third, the historical experiences of each movement led not only to uneven democratisation but also to different politics of each movement. The colourful 'thick' politics of the women's movement derives from its active participation in the pre-transitional *minjung* movement, while the popular 'thin' politics of the environmental movement is related to its non-participation in pretransitional democratic movement or its belated birth after the transition. The confrontation politics of militant labour movement and its double wing strategy is attributable to its simultaneous birth with the popular mobilisation and political democracy. The contour line of democracy and democratisation the Korean social movements drew was uneven. Their ability for opinion-, will-, and policy formation was not the same. It was not only dependent upon their own ability but also their pre-transitional history, relationships with the state and other non-state actors. The table below summarises the comparisons of the discussed three movements.

Table 2 Labour, Environmental, and Women's Movements in comparison ('D' stands for domination)

		Pre-transition (PrT)	**Post-transition (PstT)**
LM	PrT & PstT Modernisation	State Corporationality (D)	Corporate Corporationality
	PrT participation & PstT politics	Immediate but indirect participation	Confrontational (labour) politics
	PrT position & PstT policy success	Supported from others	Success at enterprise level and failure at policy level
	Relationship with other movements	Dependent on others	Tension with EM & Cooperation with WM
EM	PrT and PstT Modernisation	Developmentality	Harmonised Developmentality (D)
	PrT participation & PstT politics	Non-participation	Popular (limited eco-)politics
	PrT position and PstT policy success	Ignored from others	Short-term success and long-term failure
	Relationship with other movements	Isolated from others	Tension with LM & Cooperation with WM
WM	PrT and PstT Modernisation	Phallogicality	Cultural Phallogicallity
	PrT participation & PstT politics	Direct participation	Institutional and agonistic feminist politics
	PrT position and PstT policy success	Connected with others	Institutional success and limited success in cultural change
	Relationship with other movements	Connected with others	Cooperation with LM & WM

CONCLUSION

'Transitology' and 'consolidology' share the freeze effects. The transitional path and founding election determine the subsequent path and form of democracy. The future and its destiny are frozen in the past. The thaw and spring belong to the past. The sign "democracy under construction" is dangerous for them. What I attempt in this paper is to show the interactive and dynamic narrative process of democratisation through the eyes of social movements. The points I try to clarify in this paper are: 1) that the image of the strong developmental state is a mirage and it has been constantly negotiated by other non-state actors; 2) that democratisation is an

interactive and dynamic narrative process where diverse socio-political forces mutually inscribe; 3) that democratisation is path-dependent, -shaping, and -interdependent. Weak political and strong civil society does not necessarily lead to unstable but different types of democracy and democratisation; 4) that not only institutional dynamics but also social dynamics or relationship among movements affects the quality of democracy; and 5) that static terms or their static usage as a solid *project* like consolidation and democracy, even with the addition of imaginative adjective, often fail to understand the *process* of democratisation, if not paying attention to its inhabitants. The figure 1 below summarises my propositions and the whole discussion above.

Figure 1 Modernisation and Democratisation in Korea



The story told in this paper assumes also a specific perspective, that of the inhabitants of democracy. Korean social movements mapped the space of democracy and drew their own contours of democratisation. When the developmental state inscribed corporationality,

developmentality, and phallogicality, the movements reinscribed democratic rationality, mentality, and logics on that surface. If one combines democratisation with these repeated inscription-reinscription plays as an open-ended process, there is no cycles of contention of social movements but a continuous process with and without institutionalisation. This is the story of democracy and democratisation, a narrative without a ready-made causal plot and also without *deus ex machina*.

REFERENCES

Abelmann, N. (1996). *Echoes of the past, epics of dissent*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Alavi, H. (1972). The state in post-colonial societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh. *New Left Review, ,* 59-81.

Alvarez, S. E. (1990). *Engendering democracy in Brazil: Women's movements in transition politics*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.

Asia Watch Committee (AWC). (1986). *Human rights in Korea*. New York, NY (36 W. 44th St., New York 10036): Asia Watch Committee.

Bae, G., Yoon, J., Cho, H., & Lee, J. (2008). *'87nyeon ihu nodongjohapgoa nodongundong (Trade union and Labour Movement since 1987)*. Seoul: Korea Labor Institute (KLI).

Beetham, D. (1999). *Democracy and human rights*. Cambridge, UK : Oxford, UK ; Malden, MA: Polity Press ; Blackwell Publishers.

Butler, J., 1956. (1990). *Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity*. New York: Routledge.

Chang, H. (2003). *Rethinking development economics*. London: Anthem Press.

Cheng, T. (1989). Democratizing the quasi-Leninist regime in Taiwan. *World Politics, 41*(4), 471.

Cho, D. (Ed.). (1996). *Nodongundong goa shinsahoiundongeoi yendae I (Solidarity Between Labour Movement And New Social Movements I).* Seoul: Federation of Korean Trade Union Research Center.

Cho Myung-Rae. (2004). Emergence and evolution of environmental discourses in South Korea. *Korea Journal, 44*(3), 138.

Choi, J. J. (1993). Political cleavages in South Korea. In H. Koo (Ed.), *State and society in contemporary Korea* (pp. 13-50). Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Choi, J. (1984). A corporatist control of the labor union in South Korea. *Korean Social Science Journal, 11*(12), 25-55.

Choi, S. G. (2006). Saeroun noksaekundongeoi jeonmanggoa goaje (the Persepective and Task of the New Green Movement). *Hwangyenggoa Saengmyeng, 49,* 130-146.

Dalton, B., & Cotton, J. (1996). New social movements and the changing nature of political opposition in South Korea. In G. Rodan (Ed.), *Political oppositions in industrializing Asia* (pp. 272-299). London: Routledge.

Derrida, J., & Weber, E. (1995). *Points . . . : Interviews, 1974-1994*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press.

Deyo, F. C. (1989). *Beneath the miracle: Labor subordination in the new Asian industrialism*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Diniz, E. E. (1986). The political transition in Brazil: A reappraisal of the dynamics of the political opening. *Studies in Comparative International Development, 21*(2), 63-73.

Eun, S. (2001). Hanguk nodongundonggoa shiminundongeoi gyeongjaeng, grigo hegemony (Competition and Hegemony in Korea's Labor and New Social Movements : Parallel growth and politicization of social movements through ideology formation and issues). (MA, Department of Sociology Graduate School Seoul National University).

Evans, P. B., 1944. (1995). *Embedded autonomy: States and industrial transformation*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.

Evans, P. B., Rueschemeyer, D., & Skocpol, T. (1985). *Bringing the state back in*. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Foucault, M., & Rabinow, P. (1984). *The Foucault reader* (1st ed.). New York: Pantheon Books.

Fraser, N. (1990). Rethinking the public sphere: A contribution to the critique of actually existing democracy. *Social Text,* , 56.

Habermas, J. (1996). *Between facts and norms : Contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.

Hirschman, A. O. (1968). The political economy of import-substituting industrialization in Latin America. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 82*(1), 1-32.

Ho, S. (2007). Hanguk yeseongundongeoi goageo, hyenjae, mirae (The Past, Present, and Future of Korean Women's Movement). *Munhwagoahak (Culture Science),* (49), 102-120.

Huntington, S. P. (1991). *The third wave : Democratization in the late twentieth century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Im, H. B., & Choi, Y. J. (2010). Democracy and economic development after democratic transition in South Korea: Democratic development and authoritarian development compared. *International Conference on "Recasting the Korean Model of Development: Issues, Debates, and Lessons"*, Washington DC, USA.

Im, H. B. (1987). The rise of bureaucratic authoritarianism in South Korea. *World Politics, 39*(2), 231.

Jessop, B. (1990). *State theory: Putting the capitalist state in its place*. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Jessop, B. (2008). The state and state-building. In R. A. W. Rhodes, S. A. Binder & B. A. Rockman (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of political institutions* (pp. 111-130). Oxford, UK ; New York: Oxford University Press.

Jones, D. M. (1998). Democratization, civil society, and illiberal middle class culture in Pacific Asia. *Comparative Politics, 30*(2), 147-169.

Jones, N. A. (2006). *Gender and the political opportunities of democratization in South Korea*

Kang, Y. G. (2007). Hwangyengundong, jeolmanggoa himang saiesoh (Environmental Movement between Despair and Hope). *Noksaek Pyengron (Green Critique),* (94)

Karl, T., & Schmitter, P. (1991). Modes of transition in Latin-America, southern and Eastern-Europe reprinted from comparative politics, vol 23, October, pg 1, 1990. *International Social Science Journal*, *43*(2), 269-284.

Kasza, G. J. (1995). *The conscription society: Administered mass organizations*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Katzenstein, P. J. (1985). *Small states in world markets : Industrial policy in Europe*. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press.

Kim, D. (2006). Growth and crisis of the Korean citizens' movement. *Korea Journal, 46*(2), 99-128.

Kim, E. M. (1997). *Big business, strong state: Collusion and conflict in South Korean development, 1960-1990*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Kim, H. (2004). *Korea's development under Park Chung Hee rapid industrialization, 1961-79*. London ; New York: RoutledgeCurzon.

Kim, S. (2000). Democratization and environmentalism: South Korea and Taiwan in comparative perspective. *Journal of Asian and African Studies (Leiden), 35*(3), 287.

Kim, S., & Kim, K. (2010). Mapping a hundred years of activism: Women's movements in Korea. In M. Roces, & L. P. Edwards (Eds.), *Women's movements in Asia : Feminisms and transnational activism* (pp. 189-206). Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge.

Kim, Y. (2000). Theories for a progressive women's movement in Korea. *Korea Journal, 40*(3), 217-236.

Koo, H. (2002). Civil society and democracy in South Korea. *Good Society, 11*(2), 40.

Koo, H. G. (2001). *Korean workers: The culture and politics of class formation*. Ithaka, New York: Cornell University Press.

Koo, H. (2002). Civil society and democracy in South Korea. *The Good Society, 11*(2), 40-45.

Korea Pollution Research Institute (KPRI). (1986). *'86 bangonghae seoneon (1986 Anti-pollution Declaration).* Unpublished manuscript.

Kyŏkdong '85 <5> nosabungyu - Nohakyondaeŭi saeroun yangsang (the turbulant '85 (5) Industrial Disputes - Worker-Student Alliance as a New Trend).(1985, 12. Dec.). *Donga Ilbo,*

Ku, D. (2004). Gaebal dongmaenggoa noksaekyeondae (development coalition and green solidarity: A discursive analysis). *Eco, 7*, 43-77.

Lee, N. (2007). *The making of minjung : Democracy and the politics of representation in South Korea*. Ithaca [NY] ; London: Cornell University Press.

Lee See-jae. (2000). Environmental movement in Korea and its political empowerment. *Korea Journal, 40*(3), 131.

Lee, S. (1999). Environmental movement in Korea. In Y. F. Lee, & A. Y. So (Eds.), *Asia's environmental movements : Comparative perspectives* (pp. 90-119). Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe.

Lee, S., & Arrington, C. (2008). The politics of NGOs and democratic governance in South Korea and Japan. *Pacific Focus, 23*(1), 75-96.

Lee, Y. F., & So, A. Y. (1999). Conclusion. In Y. F. Lee, & A. Y. So (Eds.), (pp. 287-308). Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe.

Lee, Y. (2009). Divergent outcomes of labor reform politics in democratized Korea and Taiwan. *Studies in Comparative International Development, 44*(1), 47-70.

Lefebvre, H. (1996). *Writings on cities*. Oxford [UK]: Blackwell Publishers.

Lipietz, A. (1987). *Mirages and miracles : The crises of global Fordism*. London: Verso.

Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy. *The American Political Science Review, 53*(1), 69.

Mainwaring, S., O'Donnell, G., & Valenzuela, J. S. (1992). Introduction, *Issues in democratic consolidation* (pp. 1-1). Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.

McAdam, D. (1995). "Initiator" and "spin-off" movements: Diffusion processes in protest cycles. In M. Traugott (Ed.), *Repertoires and cycles of collective action* (pp. 217-240) Duke University Press.

McAdam, D., Tarrow, S. G., & Tilly, C. (2001). *Dynamics of contention*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Melucci, A. (1996). *Challenging codes : Collective action in the information age*. Cambridge [England] ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Minns, J. (2001). The labour movement in South Korea. *Labour History*, (81), 175-195.

Moon, S. (2002). Carving out space: Civil society and the women's movement in South Korea. *The Journal of Asian Studies, 61*(02), 473.

Moon, S. (2005). *Militarized modernity and gendered citizenship in South Korea*. Durham [NC] ; London: Duke University Press.

Neher, C. D., & Marlay, R. (1995). *Democracy and development in Southeast Asia : The winds of change*. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press.

O'Donnell, G. (1977). Corporatism and the question of the state. In J. M. Malloy (Ed.), *Authoritarianism and corporatism in Latin America* (pp. 47-87). Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

O'Donnell, G. A., & Schmitter, P. C. (1986). *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Park, C. H. (2005). *Han'guk kungmin ege koham* (880-03 ChÊ»opÊ»an ed.). SoÌ□ul: TongsoÌ□ Munhwasa.

Park, M. (2008). *Democracy and social change : A history of South Korean student movements, 1980-2000*. Bern: Peter Lang.

Park, C. H., 1917-1979. (1979). *Korea reborn: A model for development*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall.

Pirie, I. (2007). *The Korean Developmental State* (Vol. 73). Routledge.

Przeworski, A. (1986). Problems in the study of transition to democracy. In G. O'Donnell, P. C. Schmitter & L. Whitehead (Eds.), *Transitions from authoritarian rule: Comparative perspectives* (pp. 47-63). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Przeworski, A. (1991). *Democracy and the market: Political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Roh, J. (2008). 1987nyŏn nodongjadaetujenggoa Nodongundongŭi mirae (the Great Worker Struggle in 1987 and the Future of Labour Movement). *Minjusahoiwa Jŏngchaek Yŏngu (Journal for Democratic Society and Policy)*, (13), 225-252.

Schmitter, P. C. (1974). Still the century of corporatism? *The Review of Politics, 36*(01), 85.

Sennett, R. (2000). Reflections on the public realm. *A companion to the city* (pp. 380-387). Oxford [Oxfordshire]: Blackwell.

Sennett, R. (1999). The space of democracy. *The urban moment: Cosmopolitan essays on the late-20th-century city* (pp. 273-285). Thousand Oaks [Calif.]: Sage Publications.

Shin, K. (2006). The citizens' movement in Korea. *Korea Journal, 46*(2), 5-34.

Skocpol, T. (1985). Bringing the state back in: Strategies of analysis in current research. In P. B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer & T. Skocpol (Eds.), *Bringing the state back in* (pp. 3-37). Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Snow, D., Rochford, E. B., Worden, S., & Benford, R. (1986). Frame alignment processes, micromobilization, and movement participation. *American Sociological Review, 51*(4), 464.

Snow, D., & Benford, R. (1992). Master frames and cycles of protest. In A. D. Morris, & C. M. Mueller (Eds.), *Frontiers in social movement theory* (pp. 133-155). New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press.

Tilly, C. (1997). Democracy is a lake. In C. Tilly, & A. L. Stinchcombe (Eds.), *Roads from past to future* (M. Lanham Trans.). (pp. 193-216) Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Tongyŏchŏng (National Statistical Office, NSO). (1998). *Tonggyŏro bon daehanminguk 50nyŏn ŭi Gyŏngjesahoisang Byŏnhwa (50 Years of Statistics of Economic and Social Changes in South Korea)*. Daejŏn, South Korea: Tongyŏchŏng.

Turner, V. W. (1969). *The ritual process : Structure and anti-structure*. Chicago: Aldine Pub. Co.

Valenzuela, J. S. (1992). Consolidation in post-transitional settings. *Issues in democratic consolidation* (pp. 57-104). Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.

Whitehead, L. (2002). *Democratization : Theory and experience*. Oxford, Oxon, UK: Oxford University Press.

Wong, J. (2004). The adaptive developmental state in East Asia. *Journal of East Asian Studies, 4*(3), 345-362.

Woo-Cumings, M. (1999). Introduction: Chalmers johnson and the politics of nationalism and development. In M. Woo-Cumings (Ed.), *The developmental stat* (pp. 1-31). Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press.

Young, I. M. (1990). *Justice and the politics of difference*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.